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E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y
Managers and policymakers are seeking practical guidelines for assessing the out-
comes of emerging pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. Evaluations of P4P pro-
grams published to date are mixed—some are confusing—and methodological
problems with them are common.
This article first identifies and summarizes obstacles to implementing effective
P4P programs. Second, it describes results from social science research going back
several decades to support evidence-based P4P best practices. Among the findings
from this research, the zero-sum and "earn it back" P4P incentive systems have
important drawbacks and may be counterproductive, neither reducing health sys-
tem costs nor improving quality. The research suggests that punishing participants
for low performance may further reduce individuals' performance, especially when
involvement is required. We suggest that optimal P4P systems are those that reward
all participants for performance improvements. Third, the article links P4P design
to budgetary considerations. P4P program designs that provide incentives while
improving quality and reducing costs are critical if budget neutrality is a priority for
the organization and its resources are limited. In these tYpes of P4P designs, cost
calculations are straightforward: The greater the participation, the higher the savings.
The article concludes by recommending an evidence-based P4P approach for practi-
tioners that can be implemented without large upfront investment. More research on
this topic is also advised.
For more information about the concepts in this article, please contact Dr.
Rosenau at Pauline.Rosenau@uth.tmc.edu.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The variety of pay-for-performance
(P4P) programs is vast, and practitioners
need guidance in determining which
types are most successful and where to
begin implementing one (Young 2007).
According to the Agency for Health-
care Research and Quality (2006), P4P
payment systems are designed to "offer
financial incentives to physicians and
other health care providers to meet
defined quality, efficiency, or other
targets." The collective goal of the P4P
approaches is to reduce health system
costs while improving quality.
P4P incentive systems are having an
enormous impact on healthcare delivery
in the United States (Epstein 2007). P4P
is among the most important develop-
ments in the US healthcare sector since
managed care and capitation (Kellis and
Rumberger 2010). It aims to change the
behavior of physicians, patients, and
those working in hospitals through a
system of rewards and punishments.
A P4P reward or bonus for physicians
might take the form of a salary add-on
to the general fee-for-service. A reward
for hospitals might be payments
beyond those received through the
diagnosis-related group-based scheme.
A punishment under the P4P system
might mean reduced compensation or
some other penalty.
The purpose of this article is to
assess and prioritize P4P programs for
practitioners. First, we summarize the
main obstacles to achieving a successful
P4P program. Second, we employ theo-
retical principles and research findings
from behavioral science and business
to demonstrate how to improve P4P
results. Third, we show the link between
P4P systems and budget predictability.
Finally, we recommend to practitio-
ners a viable P4P design that includes
evidence-based best practices and does
not require a large initial investment.
I S S U E S S U R R O U N D I N G
P A Y - F O R - P E R F O R M A N C E
I M P L E M E N T A T I O N
Results Are Mixed
Taken together, the results of P4P
programs in the United States can be
characterized at best as mixed and at
worst as inconclusive (Peterson et al.
2006; Wodchis, Ross, and Detsky 2007).
Some studies outline clear evidence of
P4P effectiveness (Abelson 2007; CMS
2008). Others indicate that P4P innova-
tions fail or the results are inconclusive
(Glickman et al. 2007; Pearson et al.
2008; Damberg et al. 2009). In short,
"pay-for-performance may not, necessar-
ily, have the dramatic and or even pre-
dictable effects touted by its enthusiasts"
(Mullen, Frank, and Rosenthal 2010).
Mixed results have also been reported in
other countries (Campbell et al. 2007,
2009; McDonald and Roland 2009).
Methodological Problems Abound
Several reasons explain why results from
P4P experiments vary widely, and some
of these are related to methodological
problems. The samples involved are
often very small. Participation in these
programs is seldom based on random
samples of practitioners or hospitals—it
usually involves voluntary participa-
tion, leading to selection bias. Changes
in performance measured under these
P4P programs sometimes coincided
with structural changes or operational
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reorganization such that any observed
change may not be attributable to P4P
alone (Colden 2006; Pink et al. 2006).
Positive results were sometimes attrib-
utable to "secular trends," whereby
researchers mistakenly concluded that
P4P improves quality or cost when, in
fact, most organizations operating in the
healthcare sector were improving, even
those in which P4P was not present.
According to some policy experts,
P4P is observed to have failed, in part,
because incentives are not large enough
to change behavior. For example, P4P
in the United States has not proved as
effective as in Britain, where rewards
are far greater—in some cases up to 50
percent of a physician's salary (Davis
2008; Doran, Fullwood, and Cravelle
2006)—than those in US P4P programs,
which are seldom more than 5 percent
of a physician's salary (Advisory Board
Company and Foundation 2008). But
even in Britain, generous rewards have
been found insufficient to improve qual-
ity in some cases (Serumaga et al. 2011).
Obstacles Emerge
Common obstacles to the successful use
of P4P programs have been identified
and are related to both performance
and process variables (McDonald and
Roland 2009; Hoffet al. 2011). All reim-
bursement systems encourage manipula-
tion of one sort or another, and P4P is
no exception (Calvin et al. 2005; Hamb-
lin 2008; Hayward and Kent 2008). The
Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion has even published a guide explain-
ing how providers can "game" a P4P
system (Hayward and Kent 2008). Other
troubling aspects include the fact that
under P4P incentive systems providers
tend to treat a presenting patient even
if the diagnosis is unclear or uncer-
tain (Jauhar 2008) and that when P4P
incentives are in place, continuity of
care may be reduced (Campbell et al.
2007, 2009). Furthermore, P4P increases
the difficulty in treating patients with
multiple medical problems (Young et
al. 2010). These issues arise primarily
because P4P focuses a provider's atten-
tion on the reward, and this diversion
may result in oversights in addressing
the totality of a patient's healthcare
needs (Campbell et al. 2009).
P4P has been found to increase
health disparities among populations in
several ways. Most importantly, research
suggests that physicians in these pro-
grams avoid sicker patients because
they perceive those patients as likely
to lower their quality scores. Because
many members of minority groups have
poor health, they tend to fall into the
category of patients to be avoided by
P4P-participating physicians (Blustein et
al. 2011; Casalino et al. 2007b). In addi-
tion, many physicians view P4P as intru-
sive, controlling, and punitive rather
than as educational (Ciraud-Roufast and
Chabot 2008). Among those physicians
who do support it, many have little
concrete experience with P4P programs
(Casalino et al. 2007a).
Another problem for P4P programs
involves how to bring them to an end
if they are not needed anymore or if
funding is no longer available. One
classic sociological study found that
when workers are being observed, they
respond in socially desirable ways; the
phenomenon is known as the Haw-
thorne effect (Mayo 1933). Indeed, tests
of the Hawthorne effect in the health
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sector find that intensive follow-up of
participants in a clinical trial results in
better outcomes than does minimal
follow-up (McCarney et al. 2007). This
finding suggests that caution should
be exercised in the decision to allow
P4P programs to lapse. One study
reports that when providers ceased to be
rewarded for their new behavior, they
reverted to the old behavior (Lester et
al. 2010). Another study found that P4P
programs that initially demonstrated
improved performance tended to taper
off in the fourth and fifth years (Werner
et al. 2011).
A P P L Y I N G B E H A V I O R A L A N D
S O C I A L S C I E N C E T O P A Y
F O R P E R F O R M A N C E
Research results from behavioral sci-
ence regarding individual behavior
and system-level characteristics are
not always explicitly incorporated into
P4P systems (Mehrotra, Sorbero, and
Damberg 2010). Too often P4P design
is grounded in intuition and untested
assumptions (Meltzer 2009). Here we
present social science and behavioral sci-
ence findings and point to their practical
implications for P4P design. (See Exhibit
1.) Of course, such applications are no
guarantee of success, no matter how
logical and rational, because they have
yet to be tested.
Social science research suggests that
incentives should be both linked to a
specific time frame and proximate to
the desired behavior. The opportune
moment to reward an individual for a
specific behavior is immediately after
that behavior is elicited (O'Daly and
Fantino 2003). Furthermore, "People
place more weight on the present than
the future—they're more attracted
by immediate than delayed benefits"
(Volpp et al. 2011). Therefore, if the time
span between the receipt of the reward
or penalty and the financial effects on
the individual or organization are large,
as is usually the case with P4P programs,
the impact is reduced (Volpp et al. 2011).
P4P programs should target for
reward those individuals or entities
whose behavior you wish to change,
such as a group, an individual physi-
cian, a hospital, or a patient. However,
P4P programs typically are not struc-
tured to do so. For example, they reward
a physician if his or her patients reduce
tobacco use, lower cholesterol levels,
comply with orders to take medication,
or lose weight. In these cases the incen-
tive is "distant" rather than proximate to
the behavioral change. Rewarding those
who successfully change their lifestyle
and medication compliance is more
in agreement with behavioral research
(Volpp et al. 2009; Wharam and Sul-
masy 2009). In fact, because even small
financial incentives change patient
behavior, rewarding the patients rather
than the physicians may be effective
(Oliver and Brown 2011).
The most successful incentive
structures match an individual's values
and goals. Equally important to success
is that P4P programs be aligned with
an individual's personality (Hamblin
2008). A provider that is motivated
by self-interest might be open to P4P
formats that are less than altruistic in
their approach. Research suggests that in
the general population about 50 percent
of the population is altruistic, one-third
is self-interested, and the rest exhibit a
mix of these characteristics (Camerer
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and Fehr 2006; Rosenau 2006). Some
personality types respond to one form
of reward to a greater degree than to
others. For example, in the health sector
some physicians are likely to respond
to P4P programs that are linked to the
ethic of providing healthcare to the
whole population rather than to per-
sonal financial incentives (Christianson,
Leatherman, and Sutherland 2008).
Social science research points to
the possibility that nonfinancial P4P
rewards are often overlooked, though
they may be highly effective for many
individuals. For those attracted to their
field because of the intrinsic value they
derive from it, nonmonetary rewards
could be optimal because such rewards
fit their values (Strack and Deutsch
2004; Randolph 2005). In line with
this expectation, a recent study found
that a number of doctors left a hospital
after a P4P program was implemented
whose incentives were financially based
(Colden and Sloan 2008). P4P is also
said to crowd out individual initiative
and discourage efforts to improve qual-
ity in situations where monetary gain
is seen as substituting for professional
and personal pride in performance. In
some cases, emphasizing monetary P4P
incentive systems may even be coun-
terproductive (Ryan and Deci 2000).
Increased pay has been reported to
reduce physicians' commitment to their
hospital (Dukerich, Colden, and Short-
ell 2002; Wynia 2009), though this
effect is not always observed (Young et
al. 2010). In short, once a minimum
level of extrinsic reward (financial) is
reached, intrinsic rewards (values) may
become the primary motivation factor
(Pfefferetal. 1998).
Other examples of effective non-
monetary incentives or motivators
involve public recognition, participa-
tion, praise, and an understanding
that they (individuals or institutions)
are "doing good" (Robbins and Judge
2007). The opportunity for more chal-
lenging work is an additional nonfi-
nancial motivator (Dukerich, Colden,
and Shorten 2002; Colden 2006).
Motivation may differ from individual
to individual (Steinmetz 1983). How-
ever, applying different P4P formats to
various individuals in an organization
may be difficult to implement in the
real world.
For decades social scientists have
studied how best to motivate the indi-
vidual in the workplace. Several theories
of motivation from different disciplines
are relevant to P4P design, among them
the field theory (Lewin 1943), goal
theory (Locke and Latham 1990), expec-
tancy theory (Vroom 1964), and hier-
archy of needs theory (Maslow 1943).
Not all are evidence based. Some have
been modified to improve their ability
to structure motivation, and these are
the most useful for P4P design. Alder-
fer's (1969) work on Maslow's hierarchy
of needs theory is an example. Jn the
end, P4P design implicitly asks the ques-
tion, "Are incentives best structured as
rewards or as punishments, or both?"
Almost forgotten are the studies indicat-
ing that, on balance, a positive reward
is as effective as or more effective than
a negative incentive (Workie 1974).
Positive motivation, including increased
workplace opportunities, is more
effective than instilling fear or making
threats (Steinmetz 1983). Experiments
in the field of education confirm this
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finding (Johnson and Johnson 1983).
Another study that can be applied to
P4P programs reports that for many
individuals, workplace practices that
require interindividual cooperation are
associated with higher productivity than
those employing competition between
individuals in the organization (Cosier
and Dalton 1988; Lam et al. 2011).
P4P designs should incorporate
findings from research on the effects
of various forms of competition, on
transparency, and on innovation.
Competition internal to an organiza-
tion is detrimental to attaining organi-
zational goals, and it reduces individual
and group performance (Rosenau
2003, Chapter 3). An absence of P4P
contractual transparency can increase
competition internal to a program,
which indirectly reduces productivity
(Thompson et al. 2002). Restrictive P4P
confidentiality contracts may reduce
collaboration and efficacy. Finally, some
evidence suggests that excessive compe-
tition in P4P programs could discourage
innovation (Jauhar 2008).
Social science research predicts that
zero-sum P4P designs that reward some
individuals or groups at the expense
of others have the potential to disrupt
organizational performance and reduce
overall individual and organizational
achievement. Those forms of P4P involv-
ing zero-sum competition take money
from participants who do not meet P4P
reward criteria and give it to those who
do meet the criteria (Exhibit 2). This type
of competition polarizes an organiza-
tion and divides the individuals who
work there into winners and losers (Kelly
2010). Those at the low-performing
end of the continuum may become
discouraged, reduce their effort, and
even give up trying to reach the level of
performance required to merit a reward
(Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia
1999; Vaughan 1999). If social science
research is accurate, these P4P designs
are likely to increase stress, fatigue,
aggression, and obstructive behavior
(Hare et al. 1994; Stanne, Johnson, and
Johnson 1999). In addition, they may
reduce the self-esteem of some workers
(Meyer 1975), lower safety performance,
and reduce workplace morale (FitzRoy,
Acs, and Cerlowski 1998).
Does this form of P4P lead to com-
petition that subsequently reduces per-
formance for those receiving a penalty?
Research indicates that this problem
may not arise in P4P programs where
participation is voluntary (Chen et al.
2010). Conversely, decades of behavioral
research across many sectors suggests
the opposite is likely to be true where
participation is not voluntary.
A similar form of P4P reduces the
base compensation for all individuals,
or base reimbursement for the organi-
zation, with an explicit "earn it back"
strategy. Only those who meet the P4P
standard will receive the same pay as
before the program was initiated. The
effects discussed earlier resulting from
zero-sum P4P may apply to this P4P
design as well.
P4P designs that take from the low-
est performers to reward the highest per-
formers and those that reduce the base
and require that individuals earn back
any compensation lost to the program
have one important advantage over oth-
ers that makes them extremely attractive
to managers: They are budget neutral
and thus permit budget predictability.
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The amount needed to finance these
forms of P4P can be anticipated in
advance and entered into the organiza-
tion's annual budget with known fiscal
consequences. This advantage holds for
all forms of P4P in which the amount
of the reward comes from the penalty
payments assessed to those who do not
perform up to expectations. Yet bet-
ter methods are available to achieve
the goal of budget neutrality without
employing a zero-sum P4P that has sub-
stantial negative externalities.
T H E I D E A L P 4 P
Social science research supports P4P
program designs that set a standard for
excellence and offer a reward for all
who attain this level of performance.
In such a design, all who meet the
standard are rewarded, and none are
punished for not meeting the standard.
This P4P strategy reduces the level
of stress and anxiety associated with
zero-sum incentive systems. The down-
side is that it is difficult to budget for
because one never knows in advance
how many individuals will perform to
the standard required to be rewarded.
Resources are limited, and provider/
player uptake, or involvement, is hard
to predict. If uptake is great, huge
budget overruns may result, raising a
dilemma: How can a P4P program be
structured to avoid the downside of
zero-sum systems and yet result in lim-
ited budgetary consequences?
Budgeting for Optimal P4P Systems
Achieving budget neutrality or budget
predictability is vital for P4P programs.
Some of the largest and most well-
known P4P programs in the United
States are optimal in that they are
budget neutral, but they may not be
ideal because they have the externali-
ties outlined earlier. For example, as
indicated in Exhibit 2, zero-sum P4P
strategies are employed by Medicare
and the Veterans Health Administra-
tion. Typically these programs offer 10
percent bonuses to the top 10 percent
of performers and impose a financial
penalty of 10 percent reductions in pay
to the bottom 10 percent of perform-
ers (Burton 2011). By definition these
approaches are budget neutral.
Some P4P structures can be optimal
in the larger sense in that existing social
research supports them and they are
also budget neural. They create an align-
ment between provider behavior change
and the organizations' need for budget
predictability or budget neutrality. These
P4P programs place success and rewards
within reach of all participants and at the
same time achieve the desired performance
criteria that result in a cost savings to the
system as a whole. This relationship is
outlined in Exhibit 3. The greater the
uptake, the larger are the realized sav-
ings. In other words, the more "win-
ners" that result from this type of P4P,
the more savings accrue to the organiza-
tion. "The more you buy, the more you
save" may not be possible to fulfill in
every situation, but where it is, this form
of P4P is optimal.
A real-world example is that of a
P4P program offered by Highmark, a
Pennsylvania-based health insurance
plan, that targeted physician prescrib-
ing behavior for improvement. Primary
care physicians were rewarded a bonus
of $3.00 to $9.00 for every fee-for-
service patient for which they wrote a
398
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E X H I B I T 2
P4P Systems That Are Budget Neutral but Not Optimal
Take from the lowest
the top performer—
classic zero-sum
competition
• Example: Medicare's experiments—top 10%
receive a bonus while bottom 10% receive a
financial penalty.
• Behavioral science research suggests that
those at the bottom "give up."
Reduce the base
compensation and use
the saved revenue to
finance bonuses to top
performers.
• Compensation reduction with an "earn it
back" approach has not been demonstrated
to improve organizational morale.
• Research suggests that timing of reward
makes for broad discontent.
• "Time-link" principle is violated.
E X H I B I T 3
Solutions to P4P Problems
Problem Solution
Resources are specific
and limited.
We need to anticipate
provider/player uptake.
Implement P4P in
situation where change
results in lower cost and
higher quality.
Budget unprediaabiiity
is not án issue due to
increased uptake leading
, to higher savings.
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prescription for a generic rather than a
brand name medication. While many
such private P4P incentive systems
are considered proprietary, Highmark
has publicized and shared its program
design, structure, and outcomes perfor-
mance results. With 5,000 physicians
participating, the prescribing of generics
increased from 46 percent to 73 per-
cent in four years. Savings to Highmark
amounted to $87 million in 2010 alone
(Diamond 2010).
Managers and their organizations
must be able to anticipate how much
a P4P program will cost. In general,
obtaining an accurate assessment of
return on investment for a P4P program
is complicated and expensive—in many
cases it cannot be calculated with preci-
sion in advance of the program's imple-
mentation (Curtin et al. 2006). This
consideration strengthens the appeal of
the optimal P4P programs described in
this article.
C O N C L U S I O N
P4P is a blunt instrument whose imple-
mentation is made more complicated by
the unexpected consequences outlined
here. P4P has advantages as well as disad-
vantages, and they need to be consciously
and fairly assessed by managers and poli-
cymakers. No P4P program can guarantee
success, but if the accumulated evidence
of behavioral research is applied to their
design, optimal P4P systems should
permit all participants to be rewarded
for quality improvements that also reduce
costs (Exhibit 4). From this research we
have determined that if carefully cho-
sen and structured appropriately, the
cost of pay-for-performance programs
can be recovered at the same time that
unexpected and expensive externalities
can be avoided. Further investigation and
research should be a priority to deter-
mine if this approach is as effective as
we expect in the real world of healthcare
environments.
E X H I B I T 4
Putting Knowledge into Practice
All participants
should be rewarded
for quality improve-
ments that also
reduce costs.
OPriMAL P4P
Focus only on
programs where
savings from cost
reductions will
compensate for the cost
of the program.
All P4P incentive
programs are not
equal.
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P R A C T I T I O N E R A P P L I C A T
Caroline R. Piselli, RN, EACHE, clinical & economic research executive, 3M Health
Information Systems, Wallingford, Connecticut
The authors present a comprehensive evaluation of pay-for-performance (P4P) pro-grams as they align with issues of effectiveness, social science interrelationships, and
budgetary considerations. They provide timely lessons that can be leveraged within
today's healthcare transformation to accountable care. I propose that transforma-
tion can take place within a pay for outcomes (P4O) framework, which "would adjust
payments on the basis of a hospital's relative performance on outcomes rather than
processes . . . with initial focus on those outcomes for which a quality failure results in
an increase in payment" (Averill, Hughes, and Goldfield 2011). In this model, hos-
pitals are not required to adopt specific care processes to achieve the P4O standards.
Their success is predicated on improved quality and access for a defined population of
patients and on cost containment as part of an organized team of multiple healthcare
providers aaoss the continuum of care (Averill, Hughes, and Goldfield 2011).
P O P U L A T I O N H E A L T H , A N A L Y T I C S , A N D O U T C O M E S
Before discussing my view of a P4O approach to healthcare transformation, I
describe the factors that allow P4O to function in this capacity.
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